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Abstract 
This paper explores the evolving definition of the term ‘unconscious’ in late twentieth 
century French psychoanalysis: structuralist, real, and enunciative. Each hypothetic 
definition of the unconscious employs a rather different reading of Freud’s discovery 
of the divided nature of subjective reality, adopting different approaches to the 
question of trace permanence and strangeness. The paper argues that an assessment of 
the sequence of Lacanian theories of the unconscious should be understood against the 
backdrop of discontinuous progress as conceptualised by French historical 
epistemology. 
 
  Let’s be categorical: in psychoanalytic anamnesis, what is at stake is not reality, 
but truth, because the effect of full speech is to reorder past contingencies by 
conferring on them the sense of necessities to come, such as they are constituted by 
the scant freedom through which the subject makes them present. 
(Lacan, 1953) 
 
The first thing to say about the unconscious is what Freud says about it: it consists 
of thoughts. (Lacan, 1968) 
 
When the space of a lapsus no longer carries any meaning (or interpretation), then 
only is one sure that one is in the unconscious. One knows. 
(Lacan, 1976) 
 
If you don’t take the unconscious as the subject of the unconscious, then you’re 
taking it as a memory, where everything is already written, and it’s a matter of getting 
to read what’s already written. On the contrary, if one takes the unconscious as a 
subject, the ‘it’s written’ lies in speech itself. 
(Miller, 2011) 
 
Introduction 
My specific concern in this paper is the transmission of Freud’s hypothesis of the 
unconscious through the work of Lacan. Though Lacan’s starting point in his 
unceasing discussion of the unconscious is in an ethology of the image (Lacan 1953, 
2006a, & 2006b), followed by the reformulation of the unconscious through structural 
linguistics, arguably his most famous contribution, his endpoint at a non-structured 
real unconscious has often been overlooked. 
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In 1931, we find Lacan’s first published references to the notion of the unconscious. 
Just one year prior to his thesis defence in which he would unfold the disorderly 
contradictions of diverse psychiatric accounts of paranoia, he writes disparagingly of 
‘the technicians of the unconscious’, avowing their impotence in curing paranoia. Two 
years later, when publishing his amicus curiae of the Papin sisters’ violent crime, 
Lacan employs the term ‘unconscious’ as an adjective trait of an aggressive drive. 
“We could call it unconscious, signifying that the intentional content which translates 
it into consciousness cannot manifest itself without a compromise with the social 
demands integrated by the subject, that is to say without a camouflage of motives, 
which is quite precisely the whole delusion” (Lacan, 1933). The aggressive drive 
deserves the qualifier unconscious insofar as it can only attain consciousness through 
distortion. This proposition is in agreement with Freud’s dynamic theory of 
unconscious formations and their modification by displacement, condensation, and 
transposition. Further on Lacan alludes to those “psychoanalysts themselves, who 
when they derive paranoia from homosexuality, style this homosexuality as 
unconscious, as ‘larval’ (Lacan, 1933). These first adjectival uses of the term 
‘unconscious’ do not imply a theory of the unconscious as an entity, but seemingly 
resemble more the pre-psychoanalytic theories of Hering and Butler (Butler, 1920) and 
the earliest Freudian writings (Freud, 2001c), employing a theoretical style which 
Freud progressively leaves behind in 1900 favouring the dynamic, ontological 
formulations of 1915 instead of the descriptive use of the term found at the beginning 
of his career. 
 
The transition from ‘unconscious’ as adjective to the conception of the unconscious as 
an entity, real or hypothetical, in the Freudian archaeological model or in the Lacanian 
linguistic structure, constitutes the founding axiom of psychoanalysis and the point of 
separation from Cartesian psychologies of consciousness (Braunstein, 2013)2. Once 
one gifts the unconscious a genuinely real ontology, as a mental entity, and does not 
simply consider it a description for what remains outside consciousness at any given 
                                                2	   Foucault	   isolates	   four	   fundamental	   assumptions	   in	   the	   psychoanalytic	  discourse,	  each	  of	  which	  relates	  to	  a	  particular	  reading	  of	  the	  unconscious:	  “1)	  A	  clinical	  codification	  of	  the	  procedure	  for	  making	  someone	  talk:	  anamneses,	  a	  system	  of	  questions,	  a	  system	  of	  interpretation	  akin	  to	  that	  practiced	  on	  bodily	  signs	  and	  symptoms.	  	  2)	  A	  general	  and	  diffuse	  notion	  of	  causality,	  acting	  as	  a	  guarantee	  that,	  no	  matter	  how	   far	   off	   it	   might	   seems	   at	   first	   sight,	   the	   concentrated	   causal	   power	   of	  sexuality	   is	   there	   to	   be	   discovered.	   (How	   can	   we	   not	   recognize	   here	   that	  distinctive	   combination	   of	   'pansexualism'	   linked	   to	   the	   rigorously	   dogmatic	  doctrine	  of	  psychic	  determinism,	  so	  characteristic	  of	  psychoanalysis?)	  	  3)	  The	  premise	  that	  the	  truth	  of	  sexuality	  is	  essentially	  clandestine,	  elusive	  and	  latent.	  Note	   that	   this	  argument,	  when	   found	   in	  psychoanalysis,	  appears	  both	  at	  the	   level	   of	   the	   biological	   phases	   -­‐	   the	   'latency'	   phase,	   which	   at	   time	   Freud	  seemed	   to	   regard	  as	   the	  crucial	   causal	   factor	   in	  human	  beings'	  vulnerability	   to	  neurosis	  -­‐	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  notion	  that	  sexuality	  is	  'the	  secret'	  par	  excellence,	  so	  that	  there	  is	  an	  opposition	  between	  sexuality	  and	  language.	  	  4)	  The	  logic	  of	  the	  censor,	  by	  which	  the	  not-­‐permitted,	  the	  not-­‐said,	  and	  the	  non-­‐existent	  support	  and	  confuse	  one	  another”(Forrester,	  1990).	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moment, it is no longer synonymous with non-consciousness. Then the unconscious is 
no longer reducible to the state of sleep: 
 
In neither [normal subjects nor neurotics], however, does the efficacy of the 
unconscious cease upon awakening. Psychoanalytic experience consists in nothing 
other than establishing that the unconscious leaves none of our actions outside its 
field. The presence of the unconscious in the psychological order—in other words, 
in the individual’s relational functions—nevertheless deserves to be more precisely 
defined. It is not coextensive with that order, for we know that, while unconscious 
motivation manifests itself just as much in conscious psychical effects as in 
unconscious ones, conversely it is elementary to note that a large number of 
psychical effects that are legitimately designated as unconscious, in the sense of 
excluding the characteristic of consciousness, nevertheless bear no relation 
whatsoever, by their nature, to the unconscious in the Freudian sense. It is thus only 
due to an incorrect use of the term that “psychical” and “unconscious” in this sense 
are confused, and that people thus term psychical what is actually an effect of the 
unconscious on the soma, for example (Lacan, 2006h). 
 
The Freudian unconscious is a limited subset in the vast ensemble of mental activity 
that remain outside consciousness. In this way Freud moves from a descriptive to a 
scientific formalisation of the unconscious; it is not simply what has been repressed. It 
is synonymous neither with the absence of consciousness, nor with the autonomous 
organic functions of the body, of the nervous and endocrine systems, which remain 
stable beyond any need of the subject’s will. (This is of course a simplification of 
Freud’s continual reformulating of his discovery; 1915, 1920, 1923, 1926 each 
constitute major turning points in Freud’s topology of the psychic apparatus, but are 
beyond the scope of this paper). 
 
Here Lacan is arguing against various other post-Freudians who attempted to make the 
Freudian unconscious synonymous with biological instincts. When he claims, “The 
unconscious is neither the primordial nor the instinctual, and what it knows of the 
elemental is no more than the elements of the signifier”, Lacan’s structuralist 
manifesto could not be clearer. 
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The justification for Lacan’s critique of the neurophysiological reading of Freud’s 
discovery jumps out at the reader once one compares Freud’s Gesammelte Werke with 
Ernst Jones’ Standard Edition, where the German term Trieb was rendered in English 
as instinct. This is no minor occurrence of traduttore, traditore; the axiomatic 
distortion involves a core assumption. Freud’s (2001d, 2001f) Trieb possesses 
grammatical structure, as does language. By rendering Trieb as instinct, this 
connotation of structure disappears; it is replaced by connotations of innateness, 
permanence, and organicity. Whereas Freud clearly located the drives on the frontier 
between the soma and the psyche, the instincts in Jones’ system belong to the soma. 
The transformation of Trieb to Instinkt equates psychology with physiology. Such an 
equivalence is in line with the current dominant paradigm of neuropsychology, in 
which physiology and psychology are treated as synonyms in the correlative study of 
behaviour and neurological models. The axiomatic chasm between Jones’ and Freud’s 
lexicon reveals their models to be, in Kuhn’s words, incommensurate. 
 
Perhaps one could ascribe Jones’ translation and its wholesale acceptance by the 
Anglo-Saxon community to a positivist refusal of any psychological division which 
does not reside in a visible corporal division. Freud’s hypothesis of the drives obliges 
one to assent, even provisionally, to the notion of a psychological/linguistic space 
which is not clearly determined by biochemistry. In his first published work, On 
Aphasia, Freud (1953) criticises localisationist presumptions, preferring a dynamic 
approach (Solms, 2000): “As much as possible, we wish to separate the psychological 
point of view from the anatomical”. This breaking point crystallised in his Project for 
a Scientific Psychology, when the choice of not publishing, or even completing the 
Entwurf, marks Freud’s distancing from anatomical neurology in favour of 
psychoanalysis.3  
 
Was the Freudian notion of the unconscious as possessing structure and being distinct 
from instincts, from emotions—after all, Freud (2001g) directly claims that affects and 
emotions are never unconscious—too close to metaphysics for protestant American 
taste?4 The Lacanian approach that endorses a return to Freud’s psychoanalytic 
                                                3	  “I	  can	  no	  longer	  understand	  the	  state	  of	  mind	  in	  which	  I	  hatched	  the	  psychology	  and	   cannot	   fathom	  how	   I	   could	  have	  burdened	   you	  with	   it.	   I	   believe	   you	  have	  been	  too	  courteous,	  I	  now	  see	  it	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  absurdity”	  (Freud,	  1985,	  letter	  82,	  November	  1895).	  4	   “American	   psychoanalysts,	   I	   have	   argued,	   many	   of	   whom	   were	   trained	   in	  Europe	  and	  found	  themselves	  adapting	  for	  better	  or	  for	  worse	  to	  the	  American	  situation	  owing	  to	  the	  Diaspora,	  came	  to	  emphasize	  the	  adaptation	  of	  the	  human	  subject	   to	   the	   prevailing	   social,	   economic,	   and	   political	   environment;	   seeking	  recognition	  by	  the	  American	  medical	  establishment,	  they	  diligently	  excluded	  all	  those	   who	   might	   potentially	   jeopardize	   their	   good	   reputation	   in	   the	   public’s	  mind	   -­‐	   above	   all,	   those	   persons	   of	   ‘dubious’	   sexual	   orientation	   and	   practice.	  Having	   striven	   to	   adapt	   to	   their	   new	   environment,	   these	   American	  psychoanalysts	   came	   to	   see	   it	   as	   part	   of	   analytic	   therapy	   to	   teach	   their	  analysands	  how	  to	  adapt	   to	   their	  own	  environments.	  They	  came	  to	  conceive	  of	  illness	  as	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  analysand’s	  ego	  to	  adapt	  the	  analysand’s	  id	  impulses	  to	   the	   analysand’s	   reality.	   The	   analysand’s	   ego	   was	   too	   weak	   for	   the	   task	   of	  adaptation,	  and	  had	  to	  be	  encouraged	  to	   identify	  with	   the	  analyst’s	  supposedly	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unconscious is vastly more popular in predominantly catholic countries like France 
and many nations of Latin America. There is also of Freud’s claims that the ego is 
subjected to the drives, ideals, and external reality, claims that go directly against the 
limitless optimism of the American Dream, of Calvinist ethics and the evergreen 
advice, just pull yourself up by your bootstraps. The treatment plans of ego-
psychology, producing a stronger ego, would seem then to represent a direct refusal of 
Freud’s intuition on power relations between the demands of the body, the family, and 
more general reality upon the self. 
 
In any case, the Anglo-Saxon insistence of correlating the Freudian topologies with 
the evolutionary division of the hindbrain, the midbrain, and the forebrain appears 
time and again in the literature. Let us consider Dr. W.H.R. Rivers’ theory of the 
unconscious. 
 
I propose, therefore, to adopt ass the distinguishing marks of one class of instincts: 
firstly, the absence of exactness of discrimination, of appreciation and of graduation 
of response; secondly, the character of reacting to conditions with all the energy 
available; and thirdly, the immediate and uncontrolled character of the response. It 
is interesting to note that Head and Gordon Holmes have found these characters to 
hold in large measure of the activity of the optic thalamus, the essential nucleus of 
which they have shown to be the central representative of the protopathic aspect of 
the peripheral sensibility and the central basis of emotive reactions. As I have 
already pointed out, it is clear that in this case we have to do with a structure which 
has come down from an early stage of the development of the nervous system. The 
optic thalamus is now hidden away within the interior of the brain, overlaid and 
buried by the vast development of the cerebral cortex. Just as I have supposed that 
emotive and instinctive reactions are buried within the unconscious, hidden from 
consciousness by the vast development of those reactions which are associated with 
intelligence, so do we find that the organ of the emotions and instinctive reactions 
                                                strong	  ego”	  (Fink,	  2014).	  We	  mention	  in	  passing	  the	  curious	  proximity	  between	  psychoanalyst	  and	  shaman,	  a	  theme	  thoroughly	  addressed	  by	  Chertok,	  Devereux,	  and	  Ellenberger. 
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has been buried under the overwhelming mass of the nervous structure we know to 
be pre-eminently associated with consciousness (Rivers, 1920). 
 
As John Forrester observed, Rivers’ position with regard to Freud’s unconscious 
diverges, simultaneously substantiating Freud’s method of dream interpretation while 
discrediting his theories.5 A major historical figure in the introduction of Freud’s 
method of dream analysis to England, Rivers (1920) also published outspoken 
criticisms of Freud’s propositions of the unconscious and the drives. And a quick 
perusal of the above quotation reveals multiple points of separation from Freud’s 
theory. Rivers collapses the Freudian unconscious and the emotions into the same 
space, a view Freud argues against in his 1915 text on the unconscious.6 Moreover, 
Rivers founds his psychobiology on the supposition that the unconscious belongs to 
the deep of the human psyche, in order to construct the metaphor—one we consider of 
dubious scientific rigour—that the unconscious is located in the optic thalamus, since 
both would be hidden, one beneath the ‘overwhelming mass’ of the cerebral cortex, 
the other beneath consciousness. This metaphoric forcing, that macroscopic brain 
anatomy has anything to do with mental functioning, is akin to claiming a computer’s 
motherboard must be located closer to the surface of the earth than RAM or the hard 
disk since it is the foundation of the computing system.  
                                                5	   “Working	  on	  W.	  H.	  R.	  Rivers	  (1864-­‐1922)	  has	  become	  something	  of	  a	  cottage	  industry	   in	   recent	   years.	   But	   the	   question	   that	   still	   hangs	   over	   historians	   is:	  which	   Rivers?	   Nobody	   has	   yet	   taken	   the	   measure	   of	   Rivers’	   diverse	   and	  fundamental	  contributions	  (for	  some	  indication,	  see	  Slobodin	  1978	  and	  Langham	  1981).	   Given	   the	   constraints	   of	   this	   paper,	   let	   me	   make	   clear	   that	   for	   these	  purposes	  my	  Rivers	  is	  the	  medical	  psychologist,	  persuaded	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  Freudian	   therapeutic	   techniques	   and	   of	   dream	   interpretation	   by	   his	   personal	  experience	  as	  dreamer	  and	  as	  medical	  psychologist	  at	  Maghull	  and	  Craiglockhart	  Hospitals...	  Many	  historians,	  including	  Young	  (1995,	  1999),	  have	  been	  exercised	  to	   distinguish	   Rivers’	   views	   and	   methods	   from	   those	   of	   the	   psychoanalysts,	  principally	   Freud.	   In	   this	   they	   have	   taken	   Rivers	   at	   his	   word,	   noting	   how	   he	  criticized	   the	  doctrines	   of	   the	   unconscious,	   of	   repression,	   of	   the	   importance	   of	  infantile	   sexuality	   –	   all	   the	   shibboleths	   of	   psychoanalysis.	   Yet	   what	   is	   most	  striking	  in	  Rivers’	  work	  is	  how	  under	  the	  spell	  of	  Freud	  he	  is	  –	  not	  at	  the	  level	  of	  theoretical	  concepts,	  where	  he	  went	  out	  of	  his	  way	  to	  criticize	  and	  disagree,	  but	  at	  the	  level	  of	  method.	  Indeed,	  the	  book	  Conflict	  and	  Dream	  would	  be	  best	  titled,	  A	  Dialogue	  with	  Freud	  in	  and	  on	  Dreams.	  It	  is	  a	  book	  which	  is	  “normal	  science”	  in	  the	   Kuhnian	   sense	   at	   its	   clearest:	   taking	   the	   exemplars	   of	   a	   great	   scientific	  achievement	  as	  its	  model	  and	  worrying	  away	  at	  the	  puzzles	  the	  achievement	  of	  that	  model	  presents	  and	  opens	  up”	  (Forrester,	  2006).	  6	  “It	   is	  surely	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  an	  emotion	  that	  we	  should	  be	  aware	  of	   it	  that	   it	  should	   be	   known	   to	   consciousness.	   Thus	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	   attribute	   of	  unconsciousness	  would	  be	  completely	  excluded	  as	  far	  as	  emotions,	  feelings,	  and	  affects	  are	  concerned...	  We	  know	  that	  three	  vicissitudes	  are	  possible:	  either	  the	  affect	  remains,	  wholly	  or	  in	  part,	  as	  it	  is;	  or	  it	  is	  transformed	  into	  a	  qualitatively	  different	  quota	  of	  affect,	  above	  all	  anxiety;	  or	  it	  is	  suppressed”	  (Freud,	  2001g).	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In opposition to this searching for an anatomical notion of depth that would correlate 
to the conjecture of the unconscious, the Lacanian perspective argues that the 
unconscious appears in a liminal space, insofar as it manifests itself at the surface level 
of speech and language, in a clockwork-like system of words and syllables uttered by 
a person, sometimes against his or her will, sometimes without awareness.7 It is this 
surface phenomenon that causes one to always say more than intended. To paraphrase 
Foucault, the ‘unconscious’8 has nothing to do with an “underlying reality on which 
we might try, with difficulty, to get a hold, but rather a great surface network” 
(Foucault, 1990, p. 105). Treating the unconscious as a great surface network implies 
that instead of memory storage, the unconscious is to be found in the variable 
separation between the ‘ribbon of sound’ and retroactive word choice. But let’s return 
to Rivers. 
 
Rivers continues to separate himself from Freud, declaring the cerebral cortex to be 
“pre-eminently associated with consciousness” and thus distinct from the awaited 
location of the unconscious. Freud did not share such hypotheses of anatomic 
compartmentalisation. What’s more, the current state of anaesthesiology is one of 
ignorance as to the locations of actions and mechanisms involved in the production of 
reversible loss of consciousness. To quote Hameroff (2012, p. 1), “Despite 170 years 
of research, we as a specialty are clueless as to how anaesthetics cause reversible loss 
of consciousness, behaviour and memory. We know how to safely deliver anaesthesia, 
but quite literally, we don’t know what we are doing”. Let us presume that anaesthesia 
is the inverse of the state of consciousness. Current research into locating the 
anaesthetic action finds no evidence that anaesthetic molecules exert their effects on 
particular protein receptors in cell membranes (Eger, 2008). Nor does anaesthesia 
appear to involve an inhibiting or stimulating effect on a macroscopic region of the 
brain. Instead anaesthetic potency is directly correlated with cell membrane 
permeability, which would imply that the anaesthetic effect takes place inside cells 
(Seifriz, 1950). If we accept anaesthesia as the inverse of consciousness, then the field 
of anaesthesia research, from Claude Bernard until now, contradicts Rivers attempt to 
locate a modular theory of the psyche in the anatomic divisions of the brain. Freud 
himself warned against the epistemological error of confusing psychology with 
physiology so prevalent in academic psychology. 
 
Research has given irrefutable proof that mental activity is bound up with the 
function of the Brain as with that of no other organ. The discovery of the unequal 
importance of the different parts of the brain and their individual relations to 
particular parts of the body and to intellectual activities takes us a step further—we 
do not know how big a step. But every attempt to discover a localisation of mental 
                                                7	  “The	  dream’s	  manifest	  content,	  he	  tells	  us,	  deserves	  to	  be	  placed	  once	  again	  in	  the	  foreground.	  On	  this	  point,	  there	  follows	  a	  very	  confused	  discussion,	  based	  on	  this	  opposition	  between	  the	  superficial	  and	  the	  profound,	  which	  I	  beg	  you	  to	  rid	  yourselves	  of.	  As	  Gide	  says	  in	  The	  Counterfeiters,	  there	  is	  nothing	  more	  profound	  than	  the	  superficial,	  because	  there	  isn’t	  anything	  profound”	  (Lacan,	  1978,	  p.153).	  8	  ‘Sexuality’	  in	  Foucault’s	  version	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processes, every endeavour to think of ideas as stored up in nerve cell and of 
excitations as migrating along nerve fibres, has miscarried completely. The same 
fate would await any theory which attempted to recognise, let us say, the 
anatomical position of the system Cs.—conscious mental activity—as being in the 
cortex, and to localise the unconscious processes in the sub cortical parts of the 
brain. There is a hiatus here which at present cannot be filled, nor is it one of the 
tasks of psychology to fill it (Freud, 2001g). 
 
Now, having considered the far-reaching transformations of Freud’s discovery by his 
English-speaking colleagues, we can delineate Lacan’s place in the history of 
psychoanalysis with more clarity. His ‘Return to Freud’ was a necessary 
counterbalance to the biological reductionism of other post-Freudians, who in their 
quest to grant scientific dignity to psychoanalysis, assimilated the geography of the 
brain with psychoanalytic ideology. Lacan (1968) declined this detour through 
neurophysiology, bolstering himself instead in the Freudian discovery of the 
essentially cognitive or linguistic structure of the unconscious. “The unconscious is 
neither the primordial nor the instinctual, and what it knows of the elemental is no 
more than the elements of the signifier” (Lacan, 2006h). Lacan’s structuralist 
manifesto was a classic example of an anti-discipline, in which the introduction of a 
previously ignored field of study prevents a given scientific field from descending into 
scientism. In this way, Lacan’s structuralist theory of the unconscious, from 1953 to 
around 1972, treats psychoanalysis as applied linguistics instead of a subset of 
physiology. For the structuralist Lacan, free-associations and unconscious formations 
follow Saussure and Jakobson’s rules of synchronic versus diachronic relations and 
metaphor versus metonymy (Lacan, 1990). 
 
1953, Structure & Otherness 
Finally, as Lacan (2006f) frequently affirms in the structuralist period of his teaching, 
“the unconscious, it is the discourse of the Other.” This phrase is a translation of 
Freud’s assertion that the unconscious is always eine andere Schauplatz to Lacan’s 
lexicon (Freud, 2001c). But, not so fast, we just mentioned how Jones’ transformation 
of Trieb to Instinkt drastically modified the connotations of this fundamental 
psychoanalytic concept. One should note the same is true for ‘discourse’. Schauplatz, 
the meaning of which we might translate loosely as the historical moment in which a 
story inscribes itself, doesn’t necessarily have self-sufficient discursive coherence. 
Lacan’s addition of the term ‘discourse’ imports structuralist notions of organisation 
and rule-based form. Hence, the unconscious’ linguistic structure. But the attribution 
of discursive order to the unconscious is not a permanent feature of Lacan’s 
hypotheses. Otherness, on the other hand, is. No matter whether we speak of the 
imaginary unconscious of the Mirror Stage, or the symbolic unconscious of the 
structuralist epoch, or the real unconscious, the autistic unconscious of the last Lacan, 
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that is to say from his seminar Sinthome on, the psychoanalytic unconscious is always 
the field of the Other. What can that mean? 
 
In order to read this formula, the unconscious is the discourse of the other, let us use 
Lacan’s structuralist definition of the Other from the fifties: the Other is the treasure 
of the signifiers, the set of phonemes and words of a language. As such, even before 
his/her birth, the language that a new-born’s family speaks, a language that will mark 
the new-born’s body, exists. The sexual relation between parents that the young child 
will interpret in his/her manner exists prior to birth. In light of this, one observes that 
as the unconscious reality constitutes a sexual reality, the patient’s unconscious or at 
least his/her fundamental fantasy can be attributed to an interpretation of the parent’s 
sexual relationship. If these prior assertions are correct, then the fundamental relation 
of a speaking being to language is one of jouissance and cognition, and not simply one 
of communication.9 What one can think and can communicate depends entirely on the 
words and language available. Lacan will eventually go beyond this hypothesis, 
throwing the optimistic notion of communication to the wayside and focusing on the 
regulatory function of language on the body experience10, on what he calls 
jouissance11.  Furthermore, this language along with the unconscious which consists of 
                                                9	   “The	  newborn	  produces	   no	   speech	   sounds,	   however.	  During	   the	   first	   year	   of	  life,	  speech-­‐like	  sounds	  gradually	  emerge,	  beginning	  with	  vowel-­‐like	  coos	  at	  six	  to	  eight	  weeks	  of	  age,	  followed	  by	  some	  consonant	  sounds,	  then	  followed	  by	  true	  babbling.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  year,	  children	  are	  typically	  babbling	  sequences	  of	  syllables	   that	   have	   the	   intonation	   contour	   of	   their	   target	   languages.	   Finally,	  meaningful	   words	   are	   produced;	   that	   is,	   the	   onset	   of	   speech	   occurs”	   Nadel	  (2003),	  Yang	  (2004),	  &	  Yang	  (2013).	  10	   Psychoanalysis	   demonstrates	   time	   and	   again	   how	   one	   binds	   his	   subjective	  experience	  to	  the	  organism	  is	  anything	  but	  simple;	  the	  way	  in	  which	  one’s	  body,	  one’s	  body	   image,	  and	   language	  hold	   together	  shows	   itself	   to	  be	  exceptional	   in	  each	  case.	  See	  for	  example,	  Freud’s	  experience	  in	  “Das	  Unheimliche”,	  Winnicott’s	  patients	   in	   “Primitive	   Emotional	   Development”.	   The	   body	   experience	   always	  exceeds	   symbolization,	   sometimes	   even	   leading	   to	   experiences	   which	   are	   not	  located	   in	   the	   physical	   organism;	   “Another	   patient	   discovered	   in	   analysis	   that	  most	  of	  the	  time	  she	  lived	  in	  her	  head,	  behind	  her	  eyes.	  She	  could	  only	  see	  out	  of	  her	  eyes	  as	  out	  of	  windows	  and	  so	  was	  not	  aware	  of	  what	  her	  feet	  were	  doing,	  and	  in	  consequence	  she	  tended	  to	  fall	  into	  pits	  and	  to	  trip	  over	  things.	  She	  had	  no	  'eyes	  in	  her	  feet'.	  Her	  personality	  was	  not	  felt	  to	  be	  localized	  in	  her	  body,	  which	  was	   like	   a	   complex	   engine	   that	   she	  had	   to	   drive	  with	   conscious	   care	   and	   skill.	  Another	   patient,	   at	   times,	   lived	   in	   a	   box	   20	   yards	   up,	   only	   connected	  with	   her	  body	  by	  a	  slender	  thread”	  (Winnicott,	  1945).	  11	  “My	  original	  idea	  was	  that	  the	  traumatic	  nature	  of	  jouissance	  is	  not	  due	  to	  its	  intensity	   or	   strength	  or	  power,	   but	   rather	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   is	   enigmatic...	   The	  jouissance	  is	  traumatic	  for	  Little	  Hans	  because	  he	  has	  no	  way	  of	  understanding	  its	  source	  and	  origin,	  or	  in	  less	  psychological	  terms,	  because	  it	  is	  not	  inscribed	  in	  a	  signifying	  chain.	  Thus	  it	  is	  traumatic,	  not	  because	  of	  its	  intensity	  but	  because	  it	  is	  enigmatic.	  So	  my	  thesis	  initially	  was	  that	  jouissance	  is	  traumatic	  precisely	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	   is	  meaningless,	   in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  escapes	  or	  exceeds	  the	  symbolic	  network	  within	  which	   it	   is	   inscribed…	  The	  broadest	  possible	  definition	  of	   jouissance,	  as	  Lacan	  understands	  it,	   is	  that	  it	   is	  synonymous	  with	  the	  drive's	  satisfaction;	   it	   is	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the impact of early pre-syntactic language experiences belong to an Other—of family, 
culture and society—that exists prior to the subject. For this reason Lacan (1990, p. 
137) claims, “the unconscious is constituted by the effects of speech on the subject12, 
it is the dimension in which the subject is determined in the development of the effects 
of speech, consequently the unconscious is structured like a language”. 
 
Lacan proposes that the manifestations of the unconscious always possess an uncanny, 
foreign essence. The subject experiences his slips of the tongue, bungled actions, and 
dreams, even eventually his fundamental fantasy as otherly, opaque to his experience 
of continuity of being. “The fact that the symbolic is located outside of man is the very 
notion of the unconscious. And Freud constantly proved that he stuck to it as if it were 
the very crux of his experience” (Lacan, 2006g). It is for this reason that Lacan 
selected the donut to represent the shape of the unconscious subject; in Lacan’s 
reading of psychical reality, mental life is structured around an axiomatic fantasy 
which organises psychical life, but this founding axiom remains out of grasp; it is a 
constitutional blind spot. The genesis of the subject that implies the installation of 
subjective division13 forever excludes a part of being, rendering it inaccessible. 
Whether it is primary repression, negation, or foreclosure, the unconscious will always 
be experienced as alien, whether as hallucination or forgetting. In later Lacan, this 
foreignness of the Other scene moves to the body as an extimic experience.  
 
                                                not	  necessarily	  sexual,	  nor	  is	  it	  necessarily	  unpleasurable,	  though	  it	  can	  be	  both.	  At	  different	  stages	  of	  his	  work,	  Lacan	  states	  that	  this	  satisfaction	  can	  arise	  from	  imaginary,	   real	   or	   symbolic	   sources-­‐for	   instance,	   the	   narcissistic	   jouissance	  obtained	  from	  the	  imaginary	  dyad	  of	  ego	  and	  alter-­‐ego;	  the	  symbolic	  jouissance	  obtained	  from	  the	  Witz	   [wit],	  as	  analyzed	  by	  Lacan	  in	  Le	  Seminaire.	  Livre	  V.	  Les	  
formations	   de	   l'inconscient,	   1957-­‐58	   (The	   Formations	   of	   the	   Unconscious;	  1998b);	   or	   the	   jouissance	   that	   arises	   from	   a	   symptom	   and	   whose	   origin	   is	  ultimately	   'the	   real'	   of	   one's	   drive.	   In	   this	  most	   general	   definition	   of	   the	   term,	  despite	   its	   having	   been	   elaborated	   by	   Lacan	   at	   different	   times,	   these	   cases	  combine	   to	   show	   the	   different	   possible	   ways-­‐imaginary,	   symbolic	   and	   real-­‐in	  which	  human	  beings	  enjoy”	  (Grigg,	  2012).	  12	   To	   generate	   his	   symbolic	   definition	   of	   the	   subject,	   Lacan	   borrowed	   from	  Peirce’s	   definition	   of	   the	   sign;	   he	   thus	   gave	   many	   variations	   on	   the	   following	  definition,	  the	  subject	  is	  represented	  by	  one	  signifier	  for	  another.	  We	  might	  say	  this	   definition	   truly	   takes	   flight	   from	   1953	   on	   with	   his	   Roman	   manifesto.	   It	  follows	   that	   the	   subject	   is	   a	   symbolic	   function,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   imaginary	  identity	  of	  the	  ego.	  Moreover,	  Lacan’s	  subject	  is	  not	  the	  philosopher’s	  subject;	  it	  is	   not	   synonymous	   with	   conscious	   agency.	   We	   could	   further	   say	   that	   the	  Lacanian	  subject	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  unconscious;	  meaning	  that	  it	  only	  appears	  in	  brief	  moments	  of	  truth,	  which	  close	  again	  quick	  as	  lightning.	  13	  Subjective	  division,	  or	   the	  contradiction	  between	  conscious	  and	  unconscious	  desires	  was	   first	   found	  by	  Freud	  and	   constitutes	   the	   fundamental	   discovery	  of	  psychoanalysis.	   This	  Spaltung,	   the	  want-­‐to-­‐be	   is	   seemingly	   present	   for	   all,	   and	  the	   stabilizing	   function	  of	   fantasy	  and/or	  delusion	   is	   to	   cover	  over	   this	  hole	   in	  meaning	  and	  unity.	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Ubiquity 
In Lacan’s hypothesis of the field of the unconscious, beyond being the discourse of 
the other, and the treasure of signifiers, and demonstrating a fundamental subjective 
division, the unconscious is ubiquitous. “The efficacy of the unconscious does not 
cease upon awakening. Psychoanalytic experience consists in nothing other than 
establishing that the unconscious leaves none of our actions outside its field” (Lacan, 
2006h). Imagine an adolescent patient who describes his father as disgraceful and 
unworthy, saying that every time he trespasses the laws of society, his father becomes 
‘hysterical’. He claims to be much closer to his mother. Since he has been 
hospitalised, he claims she is the only one he misses. One he trusts his therapist, he 
relates his story of sexual abuse at age six. A cousin called him into the garden, far 
from the other members of his family, where they exchanged fellatio, ‘mamadas’ he 
calls it. The cousin was fifteen years old. He never told anyone of this, neither his 
parents, nor his siblings. Then as his fifteenth birthday approaches, he enters a drug 
rehabilitation centre as an inpatient. During his stay he has his fifteenth birthday, and 
at that time loses his virginity to a younger boy. 
 
On entering adolescence, he began to hang out with gangs, often escaping from the 
house and school without his parents’ knowledge. His father regularly beat him for 
this. After intentionally flunking out of an intermediate school his father respected, but 
which he judged too posh, he encountered drugs. Initially he robbed his parents to for 
drug money, but after his first internment, he stopped robbing and begins selling drugs 
for money. At this time stopped attending high school. This path coming closer and 
closer to narcotraffic continued until the death of his best friend produced a traumatic 
cut. Whereas his elder brother shares his father’s name and style of dress, the patient 
has always eschewed this style in favour of streetwear. 
 
During his second internment, he dreams regularly of his mother, and of his best-
friend who was recently killed. The fifteen, the mamadas, the maternal proximity and 
unworthy father, his flirtation with organised crime, all these historical narratives 
show the pervasive influence of the unconscious clockwork on the history of the 
subject. The laws of the unconscious are traceable in the repetitions of his desire. He 
remembers, from his childhood, that his mother would always ask him, repeating the 
old song, “when you grow up, you won’t be bad will you?” The case remains 
unfinished, yet one can clearly observe how this apparently innocuous speech takes on 
the value of the Other’s desire and becomes destiny. This fragment of speech does not 
account for the specific jouissance of his way of badness, any more than it justifies the 
underlying hysteric logic of the case. Instead the mode of jouissance and structure 
combine with the Other’s speech in spinning fate. 
 
From this point, one might propose a stronger hypothesis for the superficial, linguistic 
unconscious; the motifs of the unconscious are present in every speech act of a given 
subject. As such, searching the depths for the underlying profound being of a patient is 
unnecessary. The unconscious reveals itself in the most superficial of speech insofar as 
a person’s speech always circles around the unconscious fantasy (Lacan, 1978, p. 
184). In this sense, Lacan initially considered that the unconscious is the expression of 
a patient’s history. “The unconscious is the chapter of my history that is marked by a 
blank or occupied by a lie: it is the censored chapter. But the truth can be found again; 
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most often it has already been written elsewhere... What we teach the subject to 
recognize as his unconscious is his history” (Lacan, 2006d). 
 
Ineradicable Permanence 
Finally, a complete disappearance of unconscious impositions on the life of a speaking 
being would appear impossible. One cannot escape confirming that even at the end of 
analysis, having traversed the fantasy, or separated from the object, or completed the 
social rite of the pass, the unconscious, understood here as synonymous with the 
fundamental fantasy14, still and always imposes itself upon the analyst. Its fate is 
bound up with the transference, never completely vanishing. 
  
In this case, the unconscious might appear as history, as the subjective registration of 
life’s coincidences and traumas. Immediately, this perspective runs up against the 
clinical evidence of singular subjects. Why did such an event mark the patient, this 
trauma instead of another? Why did this shared experience traumatise one and not 
others? The enigma of the emergence of a fundamental subjective nature poses 
insurmountable difficulties to a purely developmental, environmental hypothesis, 
tabula rasa style. As Leclaire observes, common opinion of trauma as caused by an 
event trips over the unanswerable quandary, why that day?15 If we guide ourselves by 
                                                14	   Miller’s	   reading	   of	   Lacan	   provides	   concise	   definitions	   of	   fantasy	   and	  fundamental	   fantasy;	   “At	   first,	   one	   can	   simply	   talk	   about	   “fantasies”	   or	  “fantasmization”	   with	   a	   rich	  wealth	   of	   characters.	   But	   the	   distillation	   of	   those	  fantasies	   is	   precisely	   a	   construction	   effect	   proper	   to	   psychoanalysis,	   in	   which	  case	  we	   are	   getting	   close	   to	   formulas	   of	   a	   simplicity	   similar	   to	   that	   offered	   by	  Freud	  in	  “A	  Child	  Is	  Beaten”.	  At	  first,	  then,	  and	  like	  in	  The	  120	  Days	  of	  Sodom,	  we	  come	   across	   an	   entire	  world	   of	   characters	   and	   situations	   that	   justify	   the	   term	  used	   by	   Lacan	   to	   refer	   to	   this	   dimension:	   “the	   fantasy	   jungle”.	   But	   through	  analysis,	  all	  this	  is	  gradually	  cleared	  towards	  a	  formalization,	  a	  simplification,	  a	  sort	   of	   singularization,	   if	   I	   may	   say	   so,	   of	   the	   fantasy”.	   (Miller,	   1984)	   “The	  construction	  of	  the	  fundamental	  fantasy	  is	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  its	  reduction	  to	  the	  drive”.	  (Miller	  1998).	  15	   “Common	   opinion	   on	   this	   point	   is	   as	   follows:	   things	   are	   stabilised	   by	   an	  accident	   or	   happenstance,	   something	   occurred,	   and	   it	   will	   be	   a	   question	   of	  rediscovery,	  much	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  when	  one	  sees	  somebody	  twisted,	  as	  when	  one	  sees	  someone	  with	  his	  spinal	  column	  askew,	  one	  thinks,	  it’s	  because	  one	  day	  he	  fell	  from	  the	  ladder,	  so,	  either	  he	  remembers	  the	  day	  he	  fell	  from	  the	  ladder	  or	  he	   doesn’t,	   we	   try	   to	   rediscover	   it	   and	   eureka,	   the	   loose	   ends	   are	   tied	   up,	  we	  found	   the	   accidental	   event	   that	   provoked	   this	   fixation	   or	   that	   particular	  character,	  just	  like	  a	  scar	  on	  the	  face,	  etc...	  But	  if	  we	  look	  that	  things	  in	  a	  slightly	  more	  analytic	  fashion,	  slightly	  more	  distant,	  we	  first	  see	  there	  are	  many	  distinct	  identifiable	   events	   to	   which	   we	   could	   impute	   the	   distortion	   or	   the	   fixation	   in	  question.	  When	  we	   detect	   several	   events	   in	   this	  way,	  we	   say:	   it’s	   just	   because	  they	  are	  repetitions	  of	  the	  original	  traumatic	  event	  that	  we	  don’t	  find	  it,	  but	  we	  find	   the	   entire	   series	   of	   secondary	   traumas	   which,	   of	   course,	   fixated	   it.	   We	  always	  leave	  the	  first	  event	  unrecovered	  beyond	  reach.	  But,	  if	  truth	  be	  told,	  if	  we	  look	  even	  closer,	  contrary	  to	  what	  certain	  child	  analysts	  who	   see	   things	   unfold	   before	   their	   eyes	  might	   think,	   to	   be	   honest,	  when	   push	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the examples of the formalised sciences of our time, this singular enigma can only be 
considered a stochastic phenomenon (Kupiec, 2009; Haroche, 2006; Hacking, 2001). 
 
Why is another drive, or another region of the body, or a different series of 
symptomatic metaphors not emphasised instead? These questions oblige a logical 
reversal in our understanding of the causal bond between unicity, trauma, and fantasy. 
It seems as though something intrinsically inscribed in the speaking being, at the level 
of his unique relation to language, his fantasy, determines his traumas. It is not the 
subjective experience—or at least not memorable experience— of a historical series of 
events which constitutes the inaugural trauma, forging the subjective singularity and 
determining one’s unconscious. Rather, it is the unicity of the subject, his unconscious 
fantasy, the incidence of language on one’s body, what we might call the real 
unconscious, which determines the coordinates of reality that resonate. From such 
suppositions it follows that the coordinates of reality periodically correspond with 
one’s unconscious fantasy, that there occurs a sort of subjective resonance that marks 
the subject with this accentuation, adding more meaning to his historical narrative. 
Thus the unconscious would be a sort of formulaic knowledge that occasionally 
confirms itself through one’s singular vision of reality, a kind of positive feedback 
loop.  
 
Such a viewpoint argues that the unconscious was already constituted, readymade, at 
the moment of subjective genesis. This of course begs the questions of when and what 
is subjective genesis. We see the tendency to find earlier and earlier moments of 
traumatic genesis in the works of Rank (1924) and Winnicott (1945, 1954). When the 
hypothesis of historical trauma is obstinately taken to the extreme, it produces 
pseudoscientific ideologies such as those found in constellations therapy or past life 
regression. One might say the coherence and rationality of a psychoanalytic theory of 
the unconscious, as well as its clinical safety and benevolence, relies on our not 
inquiring too often and too insistently into the enigmatic birth of the subject; one 
cannot know prehistory (Garcia-Castellano, 1997). 
 
 
 
                                                comes	   to	   shove	   any	   event	   might	   be	   considered	   as	   having	   produced	   any	  distortion,	   fixation,	   or	   deformation.	   So,	   there’s	   something	   that’s	   starting	   to	   be	  bothersome.	  Why	  is	  it	  on	  this	  day	  when	  he	  saw	  past	  that	  shrub,	  or	  through	  that	  open	   door,	   rather	   than	   on	   another	   day	   when	   he	   saw	   from	   atop	   the	   granary	  haystack,	  anyway	  why	  would	  such	  an	  event	  rather	   than	  any	  other	  have	   fixated	  the	   dominance	   of	   the	   scopic	   function?	   Of	   course	   we	   can	   construct	   an	   entire	  succession,	  but	  you	  must	   see	   that	   this	  poses	   the	   fundamental	  problem	  of	  what	  makes	   for	   an	   event;	   what	   makes	   the	   event,	   what	   produces	   it,	   what	   of	   this	  perspective	  is	  supposed	  to	  cause	  the	  fixation?	  The	  accidental,	  the	  traumatic,	  the	  series	  of	  events	  no	  doubt,	  provided	  we	  clarify	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  that,	  and	  what	  truly	  makes	  for	  the	  specificity	  or	  the	  singularity	  of	  an	  event	  and	  above	  all	  gives	  it	  its	   traumatic	  character...	   In	  other	  words,	   I	   think	   that	   to	  really	  understand	  what	  happens	   and	   what	   a	   certain	   type	   of	   erogenic	   body	   concerns,	   meaning	   a	  singularity,	   this	   famous	   genetic	   perspective	   must	   be	   radically	   dismantled”	  (Leclaire,	  1999,	  pp.	  74-­‐78).	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1964, Organ or Engraving 
Lacan did not restrict his study of structural attributes of language—synchrony and 
diachrony— to elaborations on the concept of a combinatory, he also attempted to use 
these notions which order the discourse of structuralism, to bring together the 
psychoanalytic concepts of the unconscious and the drives. In 1964, the year of his 
divergence from Freud, Lacan remarked that the unconscious possesses a rhythmic 
character in that it appears in the slip of the tongue only to disappear instantly; he 
ascribes this repetitive manifestation to a Sisyphean impossibility of attaining some 
object or truth that is always missed. 
 
If the unconscious is what closes up again as soon as it has opened, in accordance 
with a temporal pulsation, if furthermore repetition is not simply a stereotype of 
behaviour, but repetition in relation to something always missed, you see here and 
now that the transference— as it is represented to us, as a mode of access to what is 
hidden in the unconscious—could only be of itself a precarious way. If the 
transference is supposed, through this repetition, to restore the continuity of a 
history, it will do so only by reviving a relation that is, of its nature, syncopated. 
We see then, that the transference, as operating mode, cannot be satisfied with 
being confused with the efficacy of repetition, with the restoration of what is 
concealed in the unconscious, even with the catharsis of the unconscious elements 
(Lacan, 1990). 
 
Lacan formulated this pulsating version of the unconscious, no longer as historic truth 
waiting to be remembered, but as a continually missing distance between what must be 
said and what is said, in an attempt to bring together the fundamental Freudian 
concepts of the unconscious and the drives. One can see the pulsating unconscious, 
opening and closing, brings to mind the liminal orifices of the human body. As such, 
the unconscious of 1964 is a frontier space between linguistics and biology; this is 
where Lacan links together the transference, the drives, and the unconscious as 
different faces of repetition. 
 
There is of course the question of whether Lacan’s pulsating unconscious errs as 
Rivers’ neuroanatomical unconscious did; after all, such metaphors are suspect. 
Though I would argue that Lacan was most likely not attempting to locate the 
psychoanalytic hypothesis of the unconscious in the human organism, but trying to 
reconcile the paradoxical dichotomy between the permanence of certain aspects of 
symptoms after interpretation, and levity of their witty double entendre. On the one 
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hand there are certain unconscious formations at the level of the bodily experience, of 
what he would name jouissance as a translation of Freud’s ‘death drive’ and the libido 
bound up in it. On the other, one finds the levity, the simplicity of deciphering 
unconscious meanings as an effect of language structure (Miller, 2000). Freud as well 
was concerned with reconciling these two divergent aspects of symptomatology in 
psychoanalysis, as evident in the progression of his Introductory Lectures from “The 
Sense of Symptoms” to “The Paths to the Formation of Symptoms” (Miller, 2003). 
Perhaps the wisdom of Freud and Lacan in not jumping to neuro-metaphors involves 
differentiating between the biological organism and our experience of body. 
 
Alternatively, instead of hypothesizing the unconscious as an abstract and immaterial 
organ16, one could envision it as the remains of the language learning process, as the 
engraving of certain cognitive and affective experiences on the body. The 
predominance of bodily elements as signifying phenomena in the analytic setting, and 
their potency as bridges from one repetitive discourse towards forgotten truths, would 
seem to argue in favour of this consideration, as does the common psychoanalytic 
experience of the reduction of symptoms and fantasies of an analysand towards a 
fundamental fantasy. The fundamental fantasy acts as a limit point of knowledge, 
further research into the unconscious runs up against enclosing walls, and the exit 
from analysis involves either the identification with this minimal enunciation of 
fantasy, or the relativist claim that even this fundamental fantasy is no more than 
fiction, just as any subjective history. Nonetheless the fact that no fundamental 
psychoanalytic symptom appears without intimate ties to the body argues in favour of 
the supposition that there is an axiomatic relation between human psychical life and 
the engraving of language in the subject’s body. The examples are endless, the fact 
that a woman whose mother nearly bled to death during childbirth—and who presents 
an aversion to menstruation, frequent nosebleeds, frequent nightmares of maternity 
and pregnancy, and grammatically ambiguous speech as to her gender and sexual 
identity - frequently squishes her nose during sessions points to the signifying function 
of this body location, all the more so since minimal remarks bringing attention to her 
body such as “your nose” lead to free association involving new traumatic material. 
There is of course the scientific question of whether this is an iatrogenic phenomena, 
one related to counter-transference - such as differences of classical hypnotic 
presentations between the Nancy and Salpêtrère schools of Bernheim and Charcot 
(James, 1891; see also Ellenberger, 1970)—but to a certain extent, the entirety of the 
psychoanalytic experience is two-body experience, in which the iatrogenic effects of 
the analyst’s unconscious are not absolutely suppressible. 
 
Moreover, the analytic experience produces a certain ordering effect, a structuring of 
the unconscious of the patient. It transmutes, purifies - if you will permit the 
expression - from a wild state towards the clarity of the fantasy. Simply put, the 
patient’s verbalisation of unconscious tendencies in speech and thought cause the 
unconscious to be structured as a function of the symbolic. This is most likely the 
therapeutic motor of psychoanalysis; to paraphrase Paré, je l’écoutai, Dieu le guérit. 
 
Lacan recognises that the fact of elaborating symptoms and fantasies via speech 
produces a certain effect of organisation. “We only grasp the unconscious finally when 
it is explicated, by that part of it which is articulated by passing into words. It is for 
                                                
16 On the flimsiness of such immaterial/material dualities see Rorty (2009).  
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this reason that we have the right—all the more so as the development of Freud’s 
discovery will demonstrate—to recognize that the unconscious itself has in the end no 
other structure than the structure of language” (Lacan, 1991, p. 42). In a certain way, 
the analytic act involves a passing from the unconscious as inexplicable symptoms to 
the verbalisation of what must have been an unconscious fantasy; this act accounts for 
the reduction of what Lacan names jouis-sens, or excitation (ecstasy and agony) 
derived from speech and language. In this way, the analytic experience leads to 
significant consequences in the analysand’s relation to language. 
 
From the seminar Encore onward, one of Lacan’s greatest theoretical dilemmas 
consists in finding a way to bring the linguistic unconscious together with the 
organism, the body of human experience. He concludes this yearlong seminar with the 
axiomatic formulation. “The real, I will say, is the mystery of the speaking body, the 
mystery of the unconscious” (Lacan, 1975, pp. 118). He attributes the otherness of the 
unconscious to the mysterious body and its inertia in treatment. This mystery of the 
body harkens back to Christine Papin’s puzzlingly innocent explanation for her 
Bacchian desecration of the other’s body, the body holds the “mystery of life”. 
 
The period from Encore to Sinthome thus involves an attempt to reconcile, to treat as 
synonyms the mystery of the body and the unknown of the unconscious. The discourse 
of the Other now refers to the body’s impinging on mental life. His clinical work in 
this period focuses on the necessity and impossibility of interpreting the enigmatic 
speaking body, of how to make linguistic interpretations without speech. One sees this 
in the famous testimony of Suzanne Hommel (2015) for example (Miller, 2012). Yet, 
just three years later, Lacan no longer equates the real of the body with the 
unconscious. Rather he speaks of an abyss that divides the unconscious as knowledge 
from the real body. 
 
Llanguage and the Mystery 
 
The mere fact that he [Descartes] speak, since by speaking llanguage he has an 
unconscious, this lost soul like everyone else with self-respect; it’s what I call a 
knowledge unreachable by the subject, while the subject, he has only one signifier 
to represent himself in comparison with this knowledge; If I may say so, it is a 
representative of commerce with this constituted knowledge, for Descartes as was 
the custom in his time, his insertion into the discourse of his birthplace, what I call 
the master’s discourse, the discourse of noblaugh. That’s why he doesn’t get by 
with his “I think therefore I enjoy”. (Lacan, 1974) 
 
Thus Lacan’s departure point is: the unconscious is imaginary and the 
construction of an operational concept of the image. Lacan’s teaching begins once 
he renounces this conception in favour of the one that dominates his teaching up 
until the end of the Sinthome, namely: the unconscious is symbolic. All of final 
accounts we have of Lacan concern a third definition that was truly given only once 
in these terms, in “L’esp d’un laps”: the unconscious is real. (Miller, 2012, p. 43) 
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What could the term ‘real unconscious’ possibly mean? First off, the final Lacan 
slowly reduces his tripartite Borromean chain towards the duality semblance/real. 
Which is to say, to make sense of the untreatable, he divides between wispy make-
pretend on the one hand, and the unmoveable on the other. A new way of speaking of 
the distinction between appearance and reality. Thus the real unconscious is 
intransigent, it has to do with what cannot be modified.  
 
The term real unconscious does not imply a complete abandoning of the hypothesis 
that the unconscious be composed of language material.17 Rather, the unconscious is 
no longer conceived of as an organised linguistic structure, which would possess 
predictive rules of grammar and syntax. As such it no longer justifies cyclic repetition 
through the artificial language model of binary code (Fink, 1995). The real 
unconscious is related to what Lacan names llanguage18, a linguistic trauma, unique to 
each person, which leaves no possibility for unconscious intersubjectivity. In his last 
period of theorizing, from the Sinthome on, the intersubjective unconscious is nothing 
other than the supposition of another who might know, another name for transference. 
Sometimes this intersubjective gambit permits a transmutation of the subject of the 
unconscious, and yet the unconscious itself remains an autistic instance. Otherwise 
said, Lacan’s hypothesis of the real unconscious consists entirely of a unique set of S1, 
but without any link to an S2 that would generate meaning and syntax. One could say 
that the S2 terms which generate meaning only come into being through the presence 
of an interlocutor. In the analytic setting this role is played by the analyst along with 
the transference, in other words, that the patient believes speaking to the analyst has 
worth. But the unconscious as a collection of S1 involves no second person. The 
necessary result of his move from linguistics to linguisterie, though arriving late, 
arrives unequivocally; the real unconscious, bound up with the spoken/speaking body, 
leaves no room for organised structure or another who would know. 
 
Lacan still argues that the way in which the new-born received language from his 
surroundings determines him subjectively. More specifically, what one says of and to 
the new-born, and the way in which (s)he hears it marks the body in such a way that 
this language acquisition process then determines dreams, symptoms, and bungled 
actions. But it is no longer simply a question of the discourse of the other; the 
emphasis has shifted to the other’s manner of speaking. Beyond the structural and 
legal emphasis of discourse, the notion of the other’s manner of speaking accentuates 
intonation, pitch, volume, articulation, phoneme selection, but also subtler aspects 
such as breathing and cadence.19 The notion of the unconscious thus returns as a 
                                                17	  “What	  Freud	  called	  the	  unconscious:	  a	  knowledge	  expressed	  in	  words.	  But	  this	  knowledge	  is	  not	  only	  expressed	  in	  words	  of	  which	  the	  subject	  has	  no	  any	  idea:	  it	  is	  Freud	  who	  rediscovers	  these	  words	  in	  his	  analyses”	  (Lacan,	  1975b).	  18	   “What	   I	  put	   forward,	  by	  writing	   lalangue	   [llanguage]	  as	  one	  word,	   is	   that	  by	  which	  I	  distinguish	  myself	  from	  structuralism,	  insofar	  as	  the	  latter	  would	  like	  to	  integrate	   language	   into	  semiology	  -­‐	  and	  that	  seems	  to	  me	  one	  of	   the	  numerous	  lights	  Jean-­‐Claude	  Milner	  shed	  on	  things.	  As	  is	  indicated	  by	  the	  little	  book	  that	  I	  had	  you	  read	  entitled	  The	  Title	  of	  the	  Letter,	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  everything	  I	  have	  put	   forward	   is	   the	   sign’s	   subordination	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   signifier”	   (Lacan,	  1975a,	  pp.	  101.	  19	   “Why	   write	   it	   (Lalangue)	   as	   one	   word?	   The	   references	   are	   numerous,	   and	  Lacan	   explained	   it	   in	   this	  way:	   it	   is	   because	   of	   its	   homophony	  with	   ‘lallation’.	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developmental trace, but now instead of involving the historical truth of a personal 
fiction with its traumas and secrets, it involves the process of language acquisition 
prior to the earliest memories. This inscription of the mother’s and others’, ways of 
speaking, constitutes the root of the real unconscious. One could even speak of the 
trauma of language learning. In fact, one might say this is the only true trauma, since it 
cannot be transmuted into semblance by the re-elaboration of new fictions. But 
llanguage is also the psychoanalytic path to a cure, one shared by the arts. Perhaps, 
instead of trauma, it is more appropriate to speak of an indelible mark. We have come 
full circle back to Peirce (1935, pp. 271) “a person is nothing but a symbol involving a 
general idea”, except now the (s)he is nothing but a letter.  
 
In a way, we have returned to Lacan’s first elaboration of the historical unconscious, 
especially insofar as it links up with trauma. Once again the unconscious is the 
exclusive property of the subject, it is no longer an intersubjective space. Yet, if the 
unconscious is an effect of the history of the language learning, then it becomes a 
message in a bottle whose code no one else can ever know. It is not a knowledge that 
can be shared, for it is not possessed by the patient. It would be more proper to say 
(s)he is possessed by this writing. It follows that one must not confuse this hypothesis 
of the first prehistoric mark with the unconscious as a forgotten memory, a coherent 
thought outside of conscious experience. And that clinical work with subconscious 
material will gradually move from what may be sensibly understood in terms of 
history, to what more appropriately could be called the primordial engraving of 
language onto the human body. 
 
The impact of the environment in the creation of this unconscious-llanguage is Lacan 
deriving an unconscious from the sound material of language. In this way it can be 
read as a final attempt by Lacan bring psychoanalysis into the fold of science, with its 
object of study, the materiality of language. As such it is a repetition of the 
structuralist manifesto, marked by his return to Rome for a third time to pronounce his 
speech La troisième. As the 1953 Rome discourse left behind biology and physiology 
in favour of linguistics; his 1976 passage to the real unconscious leaves behind 
linguistics to forge a science of the letter. 
 
This accentuation of the llanguage aspect of the real unconscious instead of the 
unconscious as formal language or syntactic structure, puts the equivocal in the 
foreground. 
 
Llangage. The Greeks, from the time of Aesop on, were well aware that it was of 
absolutely capital importance. There is a well-known fable on this topic, but 
                                                ‘Lallation’	  comes	  from	  the	  Latin	  lallare,	  which	  the	  dictionaries	  say	  designates	  the	  act	   of	   singing	   ‘la,	   la’	   to	   send	   infants	   to	   sleep.	   The	   term	   also	   designates	   the	  babbling	   of	   the	   infant	   who	   doesn’t	   yet	   speak	   but	   who	   already	   makes	   sounds.	  Lallation	   is	   sound	   separated	   from	  meaning,	   but	   nonetheless	   as	  we	   known	   not	  separated	  from	  the	  infant’s	  state	  of	  satisfaction.	  Lalangue	  evokes	  the	  speech	  that	  is	  transmitted	  before	  syntactically	  structured	  language.	  Lacan	  says	  that	  lalangue,	  as	  one	  word,	  means	  the	  mother	  tongue:	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  first	  things	  heard,	  to	  parallel	  the	  first	  forms	  of	  bodily	  care”	  (Soler,	  2014,	  25).	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nobody notices it. It is no coincidence at all that, whatever llanguage it is that one 
receives the first imprint of, words are equivocal. It is certainly no coincidence that 
in French the words ‘ne’, ‘not’, is pronounced the same as the word ‘nœud’, ‘knot’. 
It is no coincidence at all that the word ‘pas’, ‘not’, which in French, contrary to 
,any other languages, doubles the negation, also designates un pas, a step. If I am, 
so interested in ‘pas’, ‘not’/’step’, it is not by chance. This doesn’t mean that 
llanguage in any way constitutes a heritage. It is absolutely certain that it is in the 
way in which llanguage has been spoken and also heard as such, in its particularity, 
that something will subsequently emerge in dreams, in all sorts of mistakes, in all 
manners of speaking. It is in this moterialism, if you will allow me to use this word 
for the first time, which the unconscious stakes hold. What I mean is that here there 
resides what it is that prevents anyone from finding another way of nourishing what 
just before I called the symptom (Lacan, 1975b). 
 
For Lacan, Llanguage— if we may borrow Grigg’s translation of lalangue - does not 
constitute a patrimony. It is not a heritage of members sharing a parish dialect. 
Lalangue is quite simply the speaking being’s unique remains of the maternal 
language learning process, not a knowledge shared between generations, nor a 
brotherhood. It would be a stochastic process, unique to each person. Lacan continues 
his efforts to bind the unconscious to language all the while avoiding any merging 
with Jung’s theory of the collective unconscious.  
 
Secondly, the real unconscious involves an attempt to link up the psychological notion 
of a linguistic unconscious with bodily excitation that resists words; that which words 
do not tame. In Freud’s theory of the psychical apparatus, the organic body influences 
the unconscious by the drives.20 The body is also there as the material substrate of the 
psyche. 
                                                20	  	  “Freud	  placed	  a	  lot	  of	  emphasis	  on	  this.	  And	  he	  thought,	  notably,	  that	  the	  term	  ‘autoeroticism’	   needed	   to	   be	   accentuated,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	   child	   initially	  discovers	   this	   sexual	   reality	   on	   his	   own	   body.	   I	   permit	   myself	   -­‐	   this	   doesn’t	  happen	  every	  day	  -­‐	  to	  disagree	  -­‐	  and	  in	  the	  name	  of	  Freud’s	  work	  itself.	  If	  you	  study	  the	  case	  of	  little	  Hans	  closely,	  you	  will	  see	  that	  what	  appears	  there	  is	  that	   what	   he	   calls	   his	   Wiwimacher,	   because	   he	   doesn’t	   know	   how	   to	   call	   it	  anything	  else,	  is	  introduced	  into	  his	  circuit.	  In	  other	  words,	  to	  call	  things	  quietly	  by	  their	  name,	  he	  has	  his	  first	  erections.	  This	  first	  enjoyment	  manifests	  itself,	   it	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Then...The real Unconscious at Geneva? 
 
How could people fail to appreciate before Freud that these people called men, or 
women on occasion, inhabit talking? It is very odd for people who believe they 
think not to realise that they think with words. There are things there that have to 
come to an end, don’t you agree? The thesis of the Würzburg School, on the so-
called apperception of I know not what synthetic thought that isn’t articulated, is 
really the most delusional that a school of supposed psychologists has ever 
produced. It is always with the help of words that a man thinks. And it is in the 
encounter between these words and his body that something takes shape. Moreover, 
I would even use the term ‘innate’ in this respect— if there were no words, what 
could man bear witness to? This is where he places meaning (Lacan, 1989). 
As he arrives at the final period of his teaching, Lacan still maintains the fundamental 
importance of the word, claiming that the subject takes shape in the encounter between 
words and body. He goes further, claiming that the word is essentially what defines 
the human; thought doesn’t exist in a wordless vacuum, one can only think with 
language, though Daniel Tammet’s (2007) account of numerical hypnagogic 
hallucinations do raise questions on whether numbers or images could act as letters. 
 
Here Lacan coincides with the Stoics and some contemporary linguists in considering 
                                                could	   be	   said,	   in	   everyone.	   Is	   this,	   if	   not	   true	   of	   everyone,	   then	   verified	   in	  everyone?	   But	   this	   is	   precisely	   the	   point	   of	   Freud’s	   contribution	   -­‐	   its	   being	  verified	   in	   certain	   people	   is	   enough	   for	   us	   to	   be	   in	   a	   position	   to	   construct	  something	  upon	  it	  that	  has	  the	  closest	  of	  connections	  with	  the	  unconscious.	  For	  it’s	  a	  fact,	  after	  all,	  that	  the	  unconscious	  is	  Freud’s	  invention.	  The	  unconscious	  is	  an	   invention	   in	   the	   sense	  of	   a	  discovery,	  which	   is	   linked	   to	   the	   encounter	   that	  certain	  beings	  have	  with	  their	  own	  erection.	  
Being,	  this	  is	  what	  we	  call	  it,	  because	  we	  don’t	  know	  how	  to	  say	  it	  any	  differently.	  It	  would	  be	  better	  to	  do	  without	  the	  words	  ‘being’.	  Some	  people	  have	  in	  the	  past	  been	  sensitive	  to	  this.	  A	  certain	  Saint	  Thomas	  Aquinas	  -­‐	  he	  is	  a	  holy	  man	  [saint	  
homme]	   and	   even	   a	   symptom	   [symptôme]	   -­‐	  wrote	   something	   called	  De	   ente	   et	  
essentia	  [On	  Being	  and	  Essence].	  I	  can’t	  say	  I	  recommend	  that	  you	  read	  it,	  because	  you	  won’t,	   but	   it’s	   very	   astute.	   If	   there	   is	   something	   called	   the	   unconscious,	   it	  means	  that	  one	  doesn’t	  have	  to	  know	  what	  one	  is	  doing	  in	  order	  to	  do	  it,	  and	  in	  order	  to	  do	  it	  while	  knowing	  it	  full	  well.	  Perhaps	  there	  is	  someone	  here	  who	  will	  read	  De	   ente	   et	   essentia	   and	   who	   will	   see	   what	   this	   holy	   man,	   this	   symptom,	  works	   out	   very	   well	   -­‐	   being	   is	   not	   grasped	   so	   easily,	   nor	   is	   essence”	   Lacan	  (1989).	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languages primary function not to be one of communication, but rather of a sort of 
cognitive scaffolding, a system which permits thought. Lacan goes further still when 
he considers language as fundamental in the regularisation of jouissance. One observes 
a broad spectrum of anecdotal evidence for this claim, from the success of the talking 
cure, to the use of writing and speech to diminish manic excitement, to the 
simultaneous disordering of language and affective suffering as described by Artaud 
(1984). 
 
Indeed the psychoanalytic experience demonstrates repeatedly that language and the 
Lacanian notion of jouissance, which might be translated in Freudian terms as libido, 
are intimately bound together. Nowhere is this clearer than in the example of the 
mystic’s agony and ecstasy. The oceanic mystic experience involving limitless 
jouissance for the silent person, loses its brilliance a soon as one attempts to put it in 
words. Indeed, the words never measure up to the affective experience. Not only can 
they not adequately depict the mystic’s unique qualia, but the very attempt to narrate 
this singular sensation diminishes its subjective impact.21 We can now see why Lacan 
spoke of the unconscious mystery of the speaking body. Though the symbolic and the 
real appear to be two distinct, irreconcilable registers—the symbolic unconscious and 
the excitation of the organism— they are intimately intertwined. Thus the concept of 
jouis-sens, or the enjoyment of babbling, of blah blah. From here one can distinguish 
two versions of excitation, one regulated and limited by the discrete nature of 
language, and the silent excitation of the mystic, which Lacan used as a provisional 
path to studying feminine jouissance, one unbounded by language. 
 
The above block quotation from Lacan’s 1975 Geneva lecture on the symptom is to be 
understood together with excerpts below from his seminar The Sinthome, where he 
speaks of unconscious effects as omnipresent, proliferated into the entirety of the 
speaking beings subjective life. As Lacan argued for the impossibility of thought 
without speech, or at least language, and he argued for the impossibility of a language 
act without the unconscious as a surface effect, this leads to the hypothesis that no act 
of thinking escapes interference from the unconscious— so long as the unconscious is 
defined as the set of constituent fragments of llanguage in addition to including the 
metonymic treasure of signifiers. 
 
The Sinthome: Real vs. Unconscious 
The primary distinction between the theory of a structural unconscious and later ones 
does not reside in a wholesale devaluing of language, but rather an abandoning of a 
                                                21	   “One	   last	   important	   thing	   to	   say	   before	  we	   take	   up	   the	   text,	   I	  would	   like	   to	  emphasize	  Angelina	  di	  Foligno’s	  ethics:	  an	  ethics	  of	  speaking	  well.	  What	  she	  tells	  him	  [Arnoldo	  di	  Foligno],	  what	  he	  writes,	   is	  not	  equal	  to	  what	  she	  experiences.	  What	   she	   experiences	   is	   at	   the	   limit	   of	   the	   vocable:	   inexpressible,	   ineffable,	  indescribable,	  it’s	  beyond	  words.	  And	  to	  speak	  of	  this	  mystical	  experience,	  to	  tell	  of	  her	  relation	  to	  God,	  to	  Christ,	  to	  the	  Holy	  Spirit,	  is	  to	  speak	  ill,	  speak	  falsely,	  to	  blaspheme!	  In	  such	  a	  way	  that	  she	  will	  often	  say	  she	  doesn’t	  recognizer	  herself	  in	  what	   he	  wrote.	   And	   even	  when	   she	   accepts	  what	   is	  written,	   she	   says	   that	   her	  experience,	  so	   joyous,	  so	  ardent,	  has	   in	  the	  transcription	  become,	   truly	   insipid”	  (Encalado,	  2015).	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grammatical approach towards a disorganised notion of language fragments. If the first 
period of Lacan’s teaching focused on the forgotten, and the symbolic structure that 
necessitates repetition epitomised in the Seminar on “The Purloined Letter”, the 
unconscious as a phenomenon of the real involves moving towards a chaotic grouping 
of eruptions, towards what cannot be said. The lapsus is still the compass that orients 
Lacan’s final formulation of the unconscious, but he no longer characterises it as being 
meaningful, or in other words predictive. 
 
As such, the primary changes to the hypothesis of the unconscious involve the loss of 
any status of intersubjectivity, “No friendship here that this unconscious might 
supports” (Lacan, 2001). Using mutual intelligibility as a common criterion for 
determining language and dialect boundaries, one could say Lacan assigns absolute 
unintelligibility to the real unconscious that it is an idiolect.   
 
The principal change from his earliest formulations to his final formulations of the 
unconscious does not involve a change to the fundamental justification. “It is difficult 
not to see that the lapsus is that upon which, in part, the notion of the unconscious is 
founded” (Lacan, 2005, p. 97). This definition of the unconscious is derived from 
Psychopathology of Everyday Life more than any other Freudian text. The principal 
change occurs in the reading given to these lapses. If in a first moment, they were 
understood as historic monuments whose deciphering would enable the recapture of 
forgotten subjectivity, now they are senseless. The theory of the real unconscious 
leaves behind the notion of a grammatically structured unconscious, as well as an 
intersubjective unconscious, or an unconscious modelled on the notion of repressed 
coherent thoughts. The parapraxes orient the final formalisation of the Lacanian 
unconscious, one which paradoxically distances itself from Freud’s thesis of the Trieb, 
which after all were determined by a certain minimal grammar. Lacan (1976) 
continues to found the hypothesis of the unconscious on the eruption of nonsense in 
the middle of an association of ideas by a foreign element or distortion. The lapsus, the 
return of the repressed is considered as the image itself of the link between the 
conscious and the unconscious. 
 
I try to be rigorous by pointing out that what Freud supports as the Unconscious 
always supposes a knowledge, and a spoken knowledge, as such. That this is the 
minimum that is supposed by the fact that the Unconscious can be interpreted. It is 
entirely reducible to a knowledge. After which, it is clear that this knowledge 
requires at the minimum two supports, is that not so, that are called terms, by 
symbolizing them as letters. Hence my writing of knowledge as being supported by 
S, not to the power of 2, of S with this index, this index of a small 2, of a small 2 at 
the bottom. It is not S squared, it is S supposed to be 2, S2. The definition that I give 
of this signifier, as such, that I support from S index 1, S1, is to represent a subject, 
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as such, and to truly represent it. On this occasion truly means in conformity with 
reality. 
The True is saying in conformity with reality. Reality which is on this occasion 
what functions; what truly functions. But what truly functions has nothing to do 
with what I am designating as the Real. It is an altogether precarious supposition 
that my Real—I must indeed accept my part in it—that my Real conditions reality; 
the reality of your hearing, for example. 
There is here an abyss which is far from, which one is far from being able to 
guarantee will be crossed over. In other terms, the agency of knowledge that Freud 
renews, I mean renovates in the form of the Unconscious, is a thing which does not 
at all obligatorily suppose the Real that I use... 
I mean that - if indeed it is something that one can call a Freudian lucubration— 
that it is my own way of raising to its degree of symbolism, to the second degree, it 
is in the measure that Freud articulated the Unconscious that I react to it. But 
already we see there that it is a way of raising the sinthome itself to the second 
degree. It is in the measure that Freud truly made a discovery— and supposing that 
this discovery is true— that one can say that the Real is my symptomatic response. 
But to reduce it to being symptomatic is obviously no small thing. To reduce it to 
being symptomatic, is also to reduce all invention to the sinthome (Lacan, 2005, p. 
131). 
 
We are still in the realm of the Freudian unconscious, one which always supposes 
knowledge. Typically, understood in a historic variant of memory and mementos. 
Otherwise, the unconscious could be approached in its symbolic dimension, at the 
level of linguistic knowledge. Puns and wordplay that permit interpretation in a given 
dialect come within the competency of a symbolic unconscious. It also supposes a 
knowledge, but instead of the historic knowledge, it has more to do with the 
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machinery of a symbolic combinatory, with its related language rules.22 And here we 
should be attentive, if the unconscious is a knowledge built up upon a foundation of a 
‘manner of speaking’ related to llanguage as defined above, then we have llanguage 
as a chance set of noises and silences characterised by continuity, and the symbolic 
unconscious as an artefact of semblance. The symbolic, intersubjective unconscious 
thus becomes an ethical hypothesis with little more real consistency than the 
supposition that the analyst possesses the intimate knowledge necessary to decipher 
one’s malaise. Then transference unconscious must fall away at the end of analysis 
along with the analyst’s fall from grace, leaving behind only the solitary unconscious. 
 
If one argues for an unconscious structured by/as language, unless one claims unique 
dialects for every speaking being—which is part of Lacan’s llanguage argument—the 
apparent shared nature of language among nearly the entirety of humanity and the 
relatively limited number of languages, ~6909 for the 7.4 billion world population 
according Lewis (2009), extrapolates towards the supposition of a collective 
unconscious. Jung (1991, p. 43) is often credited with a mystic, religious concept of 
the collective unconscious, but in the 1911 edition of the Traumdeutung, Freud 
concurs with Ferenczi that “every tongue has its own dream-language”. Artemidorous’ 
famous account of Aristander ‘most happy interpretation’ is available in both ancient 
Greek and modern French, though not in English.23 It comes down to a question of 
where one demarcates languages and dialects. So long as one works within the 
intersubjective transference unconscious, at the level of the meaning of symptoms and 
unconscious formations, then the language code is shared between analyst and 
analysand, here we are at the level of Ferenczi’s dream tongues. However, once one 
claims that this language is an elaborate artefact built upon llanguage, a hypothetic 
marking or regulating instrument of bodily excitation, then the probability of 
intersubjectivity becomes astronomically infinitesimal. It is at this level that Lacan 
objects to Jung’s theory of a collective unconscious. 
 
If the unconscious is the product of a unique inscription of language from chance 
encounters with ways of speaking found in one’s early environment, then it would 
never recur in the same way for two people. But Lacan goes even further than this 
                                                22	  “The	  unconscious	  supposes	  a	  knowledge,	  but	  beyond	  this,	  the	  unconscious	  is	  entirely	   reducible	   to	   knowledge.	   Nevertheless,	   what	   Lacan	   calls	   here	   the	  unconscious,	  unconscious-­‐knowledge,	  is	  the	  symbolic	  unconscious,	  meaning	  cut	  off	   from	  the	   imaginary,	   from	  the	  body.	  And	   thus	  what	  he	  calls	   the	  unconscious	  properly	   speaking,	   this	   interpretable	   unconscious,	   one	   must	   say	   it	   is	   an	  unconscious	  disjointed	  from	  the	  body	  and	  therefore	  disjointed	  from	  what	  we	  call	  since	  Freud	  the	  drives,	  which	  obey	  another	  logic	  than	  that	  of	  S1	  S2”	  (Miller,	  2012,	  44).	  23	  “I	  think	  too	  that	  Aristander	  gave	  a	  most	  happy	  interpretation	  to	  Alexander	  of	  Macedon	  when	   he	   had	   surrounded	   Tyre	   and	  was	   besieging	   it	   but	   was	   feeling	  uneasy	   and	   disturbed	   by	   the	   length	   of	   time	   the	   siege	   was	   taking.	   Alexander	  dreamt	  he	  saw	  a	  satyr	  dancing	  on	  his	   shield.	  Aristander	  happened	   to	  be	   in	   the	  neighbourhood	  of	  Tyre,	  in	  attendance	  on	  the	  king	  during	  his	  Syrian	  campaign.	  By	  dividing	  the	  word	  satyr	  [σάτυρος]	  into	  σά	  and	  τυρος	  he	  encouraged	  the	  king	  to	  press	  home	  the	  siege	  so	  that	  he	  become	  master	  of	  the	  city.	  (σά	  τυρος	  =	  Tyre	  is	  thine.)”	  (Freud,	  2001c)	  In	  French	  one	  finds:	  satyre,	  sa	  Tyre,	  satire,	  ça	  tire,	  etc.	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absolute difference from inscription, arguing that living languages are in continual 
evolution, not only for language communities but for individuals. It would follow that 
if languages are in continual evolution then the notion of archetypes enveloping the 
totality of humanity—unless they derive from some structure besides language— 
could be justly described as a psychoanalytic version of the normative, reminiscent of 
Genet’s epiphany that everyman is equal and worth any other.24 In Lacan’s 
terminology, this passion of interchangeability belongs to the dimension of images, 
and not to the discontinuous nature of language. 
 
One creates this tongue, one creates this tongue in as much, in as much as at every 
instant one gives it a meaning. It is not reserved to the sentences in which the 
tongue is created. At every instant one gives a little prod, otherwise the tongue 
would not be living. It is living in as much as at every instant it is created. And that 
is why there is no collective unconscious, that there are only particular 
unconsciousness’, in so far as everyone, at every instant, gives a little prod to the 
tongue he speaks (Lacan, 2005, p. 133). 
                                                24	   “Something	   that	   seemed	   to	   me	   like	   a	   rottenness	   was	   in	   the	   process	   of	  corrupting	   my	   entire	   former	   vision	   of	   the	   world.	   When,	   one	   day,	   in	   a	   train	  compartment,	   while	   looking	   at	   the	   passenger	   sitting	   opposite	   me,	   I	   had	   the	  revelation	   that	  every	  man	   is	  worth	  as	  much	   as	  every	  other...	  This	  man	  had	   just	  raised	  his	  eyes	   from	  a	  newspaper,	  and	  quite	  simply	  had	  placed	  them,	  no	  doubt	  inadvertently,	   on	  my	   own	  which,	   in	   the	   same	   accidental	  way,	   were	   looking	   at	  him.	  Did	  he	  immediately	  experience	  the	  same	  emotion	  -­‐	  and	  same	  disarray	  -­‐	  as	  I	  did?	  His	  gaze	  was	  not	  that	  of	  another	  person:	  it	  was	  my	  own	  I	  meet	  in	  a	  mirror,	  by	   accident	   and	   in	   solitude	   and	   forgetting	  myself.	  What	   I	   experienced	   I	   could	  convey	   only	   in	   this	   form:	   I	   flowed	   out	   of	  my	   body,	   through	  my	   eyes,	   into	   the	  traveler’s	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  the	  traveler	  flowed	  into	  my	  own.	  Or	  rather:	  I	  had	  flowed,	  for	  the	  look	  was	  so	  brief	  that	  I	  can	  recall	  it	  only	  with	  the	  help	  of	  this	  tense	  of	  the	  verb.	  The	  passenger	  returned	  to	  his	  reading.	  Stupefied	  by	  what	  I	  had	  just	  discovered,	   only	   then	   did	   I	   think	   of	   examining	   the	   unknown	  man,	   and	   I	   came	  away	   with	   the	   impression	   of	   disgust	   described	   earlier:	   beneath	   his	   crumpled,	  rough,	  dingy	  clothes,	  his	  body	  must	  have	  been	  dirty	  and	  wrinkled.	  His	  mouth	  was	  soft	  and	  protected	  by	  a	  badly	   trimmed	  moustache,	   I	   tome	  myself	   that	   this	  man	  was	  probably	  spineless,	  maybe	  cowardly.	  He	  was	  over	  fifty.	  The	  train	  continued	  its	  indifferent	  course	  through	  French	  villages...	  This	  disagreeable	  experience	  did	  not	   happen	   again,	   either	   in	   its	   fresh	   suddenness	   or	   in	   its	   intensity,	   but	   its	  consequences	  within	  me	  have	   never	   stopped	  being	   felt.	  What	   I	   experienced	   in	  the	   train	   seemed	   to	   me	   like	   a	   revelation:	   after	   the	   accidents	   -­‐	   in	   this	   case	  repugnant	  -­‐	  of	  his	  appearance,	  this	  man	  contained,	  and	  let	  me	  detect,	  what	  made	  him	  identical	  to	  me.	  (I	  wrote	  that	  sentence	  first,	  but	  I	  corrected	  it	  with	  this,	  more	  precise	  and	  more	  distressing:	  I	  knew	  I	  was	  identical	  to	  this	  man)”	  (Genet,	  2013).	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And so we find, in the seminars and writings from 1975-1981, the real unconscious, 
Lacan’s sinthomatic production, progressively abandons hope in the intersubjective 
unconscious, moving towards a more isolated unconscious. One could say that 
Lacan’s teaching does not end on an upbeat note. The unconscious continues to belong 
to the field of the Other; not as imposed rules of language and society, nor as the 
repository of a languages vocabulary, but insofar as it compiles the singular marks of 
hearing speech and learning language. Lacan’s theory of the unconscious moves from 
a kind of knowledge without subject, to a fictional construction established on the 
senseless traces of llanguage.  
 
This Other is located in the interior, or at least on the body of the speaking being; 
though we speak loosely of social institutions of culture, rites, and language, 
Durkheim (2014) makes a convincing case that social facts are internal to individuals, 
where else could they possibly be inscribed? The schizophrenic subject demonstrates 
that the Other is, an act of faith, faith that the throng of others is more than just an 
endless series of peers. It is for this reason that Lacan and Miller employ the term 
‘extimacy’25, to speak of what remains foreign even as it is the most intimate part of a 
speaking being; that the closest a human gets to an ontological justification remains in 
the field of otherness.26 The unconscious inhabits this paradoxical space. The 
unconscious is not found in peers, nor does it reside entirely in a shared symbolic 
space. Instead, its uncanny nature recalls Winnicott’s invention of transitional space, 
yet Lacan brings the unconscious closer to the traces of the other on the one, than the 
collaborative intersubjective space of Winnicott (Conway, 2011). 
 
 
The Last Lacan: The Senseless Unconscious of the Preface to 
the English Edition 
In 1976 during his seminar on l’une-bévue, faced with the proposition that the 
analysand arrives at the end of analysis through identifying with his analyst, Lacan 
places himself in direct opposition. The identification of the patient to doctor as a 
means of ending the analytic experience, is exactly what we see in the famous as-if 
case described in detail by Helene Deutsch (1991). She wrote of those patients who 
advance very rapidly in their treatment until demanding to be recognised as worthy 
                                                25	   “Even	   in	   Heidegger’s	   writings	   one	   comes	   upon	   the	   idea	   that	   man	   -­‐	   being	  connected	   to	   the	   environment	   and	   to	   the	   future	   -­‐	   is	   always	   projecting	   himself	  outside	   himself.	  What	  Heidegger	   called	  Dasein	   is	   not	   an	   interiority.	  He	   defines	  the	   existence	   of	   man	   not	   as	   an	   interiority,	   an	   inner	   something	   like	   ideas	   or	  feelings,	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  constant	  projecting	  outside.	  Heidegger	  himself	  invented	  the	  notion	  of	  ex-­‐sistence	  -­‐	  stare	  outside	  -­‐	  that	  Lacan	  took	  up;	  Heidegger	  himself	  invented	   the	   distinction	   between	   ex-­‐sistence	   and	   insistence.	   Having	   no	  interiority,	   one	   projects	   outside,	   and	   this	   repeats	   itself;	   Lacan’s	   wordplay	   on	  “L’instance	   de	   la	   lettre’	   (The	   Instance	   [meaning	   ‘agency’	   or	   ‘insistence’]	   of	   the	  Letter)	  stems	  in	  reality	  from	  Heidegger.”	  (Fink	  et	  al.,	  1996,	  10)	  26	   “The	   term	   ‘extimacy’	   (extimité),	   coined	   by	   Lacan	   from	   the	   term	   ‘intimacy’	  (intimité),	   occurs	   two	   or	   three	   times	   in	   the	   Seminar,	   and	   it	   will	   be	   for	   us	   to	  transform	  this	  term	  into	  an	  articulation,	  a	  structure,	  to	  produce	  it	  as	  an	  S1	  which	  would	   allow	   us	   to	   go	   beyond	   and	   over	   the	   confusion	   that	   we	   first	   experience	  when	  faced	  with	  such	  a	  signifier”	  (Miller,	  2010). 
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analysts just as their doctor, as though manoeuvring oneself to being equal to the other 
justified the completion of analysis and brought along with the title of psychoanalyst, 
just as the other. 
 
It is a question of much interest since it would result in certain remarks that have 
been advanced, that the end of analysis should be to identify oneself to the analyst. 
For my part, I do not think so, but this is what Balint maintains at any rate, and it is 
very surprising. To what then does one identify at the end of analysis? With one’s 
unconscious? This is what I do not believe. I don’t believe it, because the 
unconscious remains, I say ‘remains’, I am not saying ‘remains eternally’, because 
there is no eternity, remains the Other. It is the Other with a capital O that is at 
stake in the unconscious. I don’t see how one could give meaning to the 
unconscious, except by situating it in this Other, the bearer of signifiers, which 
pulls the strings of what is imprudently called, imprudently because it is here that 
there arises the question of what the subject is from the moment that it so entirely 
depends upon the Other. So then, this mapping named analysis consist in what? 
Might it be or might it not be, to identify oneself, to identify oneself while taking 
some insurance, a kind of distance, from identifying oneself to one’s symptom? 
(Lacan, November 16th 1976) 
 
Lacan unhesitatingly criticises the patient’s identification with the analyst as the right 
exist from the analytic experience. Moreover he criticises any notion of harmonious 
identification with one’s unconscious: love one’s unconscious yes, yet to identify with 
it is out of the question.27 The unconscious remains on the foreign side of the Other, 
                                                27	  “But	  if	  the	  x	  of	  the	  relation	  that	  might	  be	  written	  as	  sexual,	  is	  the	  signifier	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  is	  connected	  to	  phallic	  enjoyment,	  we	  have	  all	  the	  same	  to	  draw	  out	  its	  consequence.	  The	  consequence	  is	  that	  if	  the	  unconscious	  is	  indeed	  the	  support	  of	  what	   I	   told	  you	  about	   today,	  namely,	   a	  knowledge,	   the	   fact	   is	   that	  everything	   I	  wanted	   to	   tell	   you	   this	   year	   about	   the	   non-­‐dupes	  who	   err	  means	   that	   anyone	  who	   is	   not	   in	   love	   with	   his	   unconscious	   errs.	   That	   says	   nothing	   whatsoever	  against	  centuries	  past.	  They	  were	  just	  as	  much	  in	  love	  with	  their	  unconscious	  as	  the	   others	   and	   they	   did	   not	   err.	   Simply,	   they	   did	   not	   know	   where	   they	   were	  going,	  but	  as	  regards	  being	  in	   love	  with	  their	  unconscious,	   they	  certainly	  were!	  They	  imagined	  that	  it	  was	  knowing	  because	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  know	  that	  one	  is 
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essentially incomprehensible and undecipherable. Lacan is very clear in his experience 
of the unconscious. The unconscious forever persists as unfamiliar, whether that be as 
the other’s language code, or the mysterious body, or the unquenchable drives. 
 
When the space of a lapsus no longer carries any meaning (or interpretation), then 
only is one sure that one is in the unconscious. One knows. But one has only to be 
aware of the fact to find oneself outside it. There is no friendship there, in that 
space that supports this unconscious. All I can do is tell the truth. No, that isn’t 
so—I have missed it. There is no truth that, in passing through awareness, does not 
lie... 
It should be noted that psychoanalysis has, since it has ex-sisted, changed. Invented 
by a solitary, an incontestable theoretician of the unconscious (which is not what 
one imagines it to be—the unconscious, I would say, is real), it is now practised in 
couples. To be fair, the solitary was the first to set the example... 
Why, then, should we not put this profession to the test of that truth of which the 
so-called unconscious function dreams, with which it dabbles? The mirage of truth, 
from which only lies can be expected (this is what, in polite language, we call 
‘resistance’), has no other term than the satisfaction that marks the end of the 
analysis. (Lacan, 2001) 
 
Lacan’s theory of the unconscious of the 1970’s is animated by an unresolved tension. 
The tension between the purely singular phenomenon of the unique speaking body and 
the apparent universal of language. In this final period he portrays the person’s 
essential subjectivity as being shared neither with others, nor with its host. It is in this 
                                                in	   love	   with	   one’s	   unconscious	   in	   order	   not	   to	   err.	   One	   only	   has	   to	   offer	   no	  resistance,	  to	  be	  its	  dupe.	  For	  the	  first	  time	  in	  history,	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  you	  to	  err,	  namely,	  to	  refuse	  to	  love	  your	  unconscious,	  since	  in	  short	  you	  know	  what	  it	  is:	  a	  knowledge,	   a	   knowledge	   that	   pisses	   you	   of.	   But	   perhaps	   in	   this	   impetus,	   you	  know,	  this	  thing	  that	  pulls,	  when	  the	  ship	  is	  riding	  at	  anchor	  -­‐	  it	  is	  perhaps	  here	  that	  we	   can	  wager	   on	   rediscovering	   the	   Real	   a	   little	  more	   in	  what	   follows,	   to	  perceive	  that	  the	  unconscious	  is	  perhaps	  no	  doubt	  discordant,	  but	  that	  perhaps	  it	  leads	  us	  to	  a	  little	  more	  of	  this	  Real	  than	  this	  very	  little	  of	  reality	  which	  is	  ours,	  that	  of	   the	  phantasy,	   that	   it	   leads	  us	  beyond:	   to	   the	  pure	  Real”	   (Lacan,	  11	   Juin	  1974).	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sense that Lacan depicts the nature of language, and the unconscious, as parasitic 
instances. With the fall of the Other of the Other, announced by Nietzsche, the 
unconscious of the last Lacan is not intersubjective. For Lacan, every individual 
continually gives life to language in a continual recreation of living language. This 
language marks the body and regulates jouissance, but is not a collective experience. 
Instead, the radical otherness of the unconscious locates itself in the absolute distance 
between psychological experience and the biological organism. This would appear to 
be synonymous with the universal/particular distinction. During the period from 
Encore to L’insu que sait, Lacan fought to reduce the gap between the unconscious as 
an enigmatic real experience of the body and the unconscious as a language 
combinatory. As seen above, during his seminar on the sinthome, he separates the two, 
on the one hand the unconscious as knowledge in conformity with reality, on the other 
the real as the inexplicable which is dictated by no knowledge. The very final period 
of his teaching, however, from his Preface onward locates the unconscious as real in 
the field of meaningless eruptions of nonsense, and ordered language, discourse, and 
thought on the side of semblance. As Freud was obliged to modify his theory of 
dreams as wish fulfilment, due to anxiety dreams and the war neuroses, so Lacan 
found himself in need of modifying his structuralist formulation of the unconscious 
due to phenomena of the speaking body and the discovery of the sinthome. 
 
For the very last Lacan, the unconscious is nothing more than nonsense which 
suddenly erupts, disrupting the semblance of the imaginary and symbolic. As soon as 
the unconscious manifestation reorganises and is included in the field of meaning and 
logic, it is now semblance. Simply a new manifestation of the fantasy of the 
unconscious. For Lacan, the unconscious’s calling card becomes its traumatic aspect, 
its irreconcilability with meaning. The end of analysis marks a satisfaction 
commensurate with the fall of the subject supposed to know and the hope that the 
unconscious, essentially, organises itself through a syntax which would give meaning. 
The end of analysis implies a giving up on the search for the one true narrative; taking 
into account this dimension of lack while grasping the singular jouissance of the drive 
which orients us. 
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